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Since the 19th century, there has been disagreement over the fundamental question of whether
‘‘emotions’’ are cause or consequence of their associated behaviors. This question of causation
is most directly addressable in genetically tractable model organisms, including invertebrates
such as Drosophila. Yet there is ongoing debate about whether such species even have ‘‘emo-
tions,’’ as emotions are typically defined with reference to human behavior and neuroanatomy.
Here, we argue that emotional behaviors are a class of behaviors that express internal emotion
states. These emotion states exhibit certain general functional and adaptive properties that apply
across any specific human emotions like fear or anger, as well as across phylogeny. These general
properties, which can be thought of as ‘‘emotion primitives,’’ can be modeled and studied in evolu-
tionarily distant model organisms, allowing functional dissection of their mechanistic bases and
tests of their causal relationships to behavior. More generally, our approach not only aims at better
integration of such studies in model organisms with studies of emotion in humans, but also
suggests a revision of how emotion should be operationalized within psychology and psychiatry.‘‘Even insects express anger, terror, jealousy and love, by
their stridulation.’’—Charles Darwin, The Expression of
the Emotions in Man and Animals
Introduction
The ongoing revolution in the development of genetically based
tools for studying the activity, anatomy, and function of neural
circuits in diverse model organisms has opened up new vistas
into the mechanistic study of fundamental brain processes
historically rooted in psychology, such as perception, cogni-
tion, learning, and memory. One of the most intriguing yet
elusive of these processes is emotion. The paradox of emo-
tions is that, on the one hand, they seem self-evident and
obvious when examined introspectively; on the other hand,
they have been extremely difficult to define in objective scien-
tific terms. Attempts to achieve a consensus definition that
is accepted across fields from neuroscience to psychology
to philosophy have repeatedly failed, to the extent that at
least one prominent emotion researcher has suggested that
we excise the word ‘‘emotion’’ altogether from our scientific
vocabulary (LeDoux, 2012). Yet this would deprive the study
of fundamental aspects of animal and human behavior of a
unifying topic, preventing comparisons. But how can we study
a topic so important if we cannot even agree on operational
criteria for what it is?
Most researchers would probably agree that emotions
include (but are not limited to) certain expressive behaviorsthat are associated with internal brain states that we, as
humans, subjectively experience as ‘‘feelings’’ (Dolan, 2002).
Such behaviors in humans include facial expressions such as
frowning, vocalizations such as screaming or sobbing, and
physiological expressions such as tearing or blushing. Identi-
fying instances of emotional expression is intuitively obvious
to a lay person. Darwin, in his 1872 monograph The Expression
of the Emotions in Man and Animals, was the first to consider
the unique nature of emotional expression from the functional
and evolutionary standpoint. He assumed that instances of
emotional expression are easily recognizable not only in
humans (Figure 1A), but also in closely related mammalian spe-
cies such as chimpanzees, as well as in domestic pets such as
cats and dogs (Figures 1B–1D). In fact, Darwin went further
and asserted that, even in insects, certain behaviors such as
stridulation reflect the expression of emotions homologous to
our own (such as ‘‘anger’’ and ‘‘terror’’). However, in so doing,
he provided no consistent, operational criteria for identifying
instances of emotional expression in such evolutionarily distant
species, other than his own intuition—much of which was
based on unabashed anthropomorphizing. But arriving at
such objective criteria would seem essential if we are to apply
the powerful genetic tools available in invertebrate model
organisms, such as C. elegans or Drosophila, to understand
the evolutionary origins and neurobiological underpinnings of
emotion. The principles that are learned from the use of such
model organisms could generalize across phylogeny, includingCell 157, March 27, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 187
Figure 1. Charles Darwin’s Examples of Emotional Expressions
(A) Expression of terror in a human. (B) Chimpanzee ‘‘disappointed and sulky.’’ (C and D) hostility in a cat (C) and a dog (D). From Darwin (1872).humans, and may even shed light on psychiatric illnesses such
as mood and anxiety disorders.
Emotions are Central, Causative States
Here, we will argue that an ‘‘emotion’’ constitutes an internal,
central (as in central nervous system) state, which is triggered
by specific stimuli (extrinsic or intrinsic to the organism). This
state is encoded by the activity of particular neural circuits that
give rise, in a causal sense, to externally observable behaviors,
as well as to associated cognitive, somatic, and physiological
responses (Figure 2B). This view differs from the majority of
psychological accounts of emotion (e.g., Russell, 2003; Scherer,
2009; Barrett and Russell, 1999; Barrett et al., 2007), as well as
some neurobiological accounts (Salzman and Fusi, 2010), which
typically conceive of an emotion as encompassing all of these
effects, notably including the subjective experience (Figure 2A).
Indeed, according to many views, emotional experiences are a
consequence, not a cause, of the various responses that are
evoked by particular stimuli (Box 1).
We agree with Darwin that phylogenetically distant, inverte-
brate model organisms have primitive emotion states that are
expressed by externally observable behaviors. However, in
contrast to Darwin, we argue that, in such organisms, these
primitive emotion states are not necessarily homologous
to the specific psychological categories that define human
emotions (fear, anger, happiness, and so forth). Rather, these
states have certain fundamental properties, which we term
‘‘emotion primitives,’’ or evolutionary building blocks of
emotion, which are shared across emotions and across phy-
logeny, even if the species-typical behaviors that express
them are not. According to our view, therefore, the question
is not whether flies have ‘‘fear’’ or some other emotion present
in humans that one should try to ‘‘model’’ in Drosophila (Iliadi,
2009) but, rather, whether they have central states that have
features that are characteristic of emotion states in general. If
so, then one can begin to apply the tools available in inverte-
brate models to mechanistically dissect the neural circuit basis
of these central states and to test directly their causal relation-
ship to observable behavior. This approach allows us to inves-
tigate general features of emotion using model organisms
without having to link them to anthropocentric labels like
‘‘fear,’’ ‘‘anger,’’ or ‘‘sadness.’’188 Cell 157, March 27, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.To develop this view, we will address several issues that are
central to arriving at operational criteria for emotion that are
applicable across phylogeny. These include: (1) the causal
relationship between emotions and observable behavior; (2)
the relationship between emotion states and subjective ‘‘feel-
ings’’ in humans; (3) the characteristic features of emotion states
that generalize across specific emotions; (4) whether there are
uniquely human features of emotion.
Our hope is to suggest a way of thinking about emotion, and its
evolution, which will facilitate its study at the neural circuit level in
model organisms. This would allow rapid progress because of
the new methods available for imaging and manipulating neural
circuit analysis in such systems (e.g., Venken et al., 2011), as
well as quantitative and objective, machine vision-based
methods for measuring the behavior of such model organisms
(Dankert et al., 2009; Branson et al., 2009; Kabra et al., 2013).
Most importantly, we seek to provide a unified view of emotion
that would afford more cohesion with the study of this topic in
mammalian systems, including humans.
The Relationship between Emotion States and
Observable Behavior
‘‘Certain states of the mind lead.to certain habitual
movements.’’—Darwin
Much of the literature on emotion is confusing for two reasons.
One reason is that there is disagreement about the causal direc-
tion in which behavior is related to emotion. A second is that
there is equivocation regarding the difference between emotions
and feelings. In the next sections, we briefly clarify our view of the
relationship of central emotion states to emotional behaviors and
to subjective feelings.
As mentioned earlier, emotional behaviors can be thought of
as a class of behaviors that are associated with internal states.
A central issue in the debate over emotions has been the ques-
tion of the direction of causality between these behaviors and
states. A common lay intuition is that the state causes the
expression: I cry because I am sad. As reflected in the quotation
above, Darwin shared this intuition, but it is not the predominant
psychological view of emotions (Figure 2A), which typically
makes the behavior a part—and even a cause—of the emotion.
Most famously, the American psychologist William James
Figure 2. Emotions as Central, Causative States
(A and B) Proposed (B) and alternative (A) views of the causal relationship
between emotions and behavior.
(A) In more conventional views, emotions are distinguished by multiple com-
ponents that need to be coordinated and often synchronized (Barrett et al.,
2007; Russell, 2003; Scherer, 2009; Salzman and Fusi, 2010). Although we
agree that emotions involve all these components, our view differs in not
including these components as part of the emotion state itself but, rather, as
consequences of it. Reproduced with modification from Moors (2009).
(B) In our model, a central emotion state causes multiple parallel responses.
‘‘Stimuli’’ include both exteroceptive and interoceptive (feedback) compo-
nents. Reproduced with permission from Calder et al. (2001).
Box 1. Psychological Theories of Emotion
Psychological theories of human emotion have emphasized the
multicomponent nature of emotions, typically including subjective
experience and neurophysiological processes, as well as somatic
and endocrine ones (Barrett et al., 2007; cf. Figure 2A). For instance,
‘‘appraisal theories’’ haveproposedarchitectures for how thesediverse
components might be related, often in a specific adaptive sequence of
so-called stimulus evaluation checks (Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 2009). In
brief, the idea is that an organism continuously evaluates a stimulus
within a context; this process is not analogous to a quick snapshot
categorization that results in a single, final emotion state. Instead, it is
more akin to the continuing layers of experience that a wine connois-
seur might experience upon savoring a good wine. There is some
evidence for such a sequential evaluation from studies of the dynamics
of human facial expressions, but simpler examples are abundant in
animal behavior (such as the example of the octopus fleeing that we
mention in the text).
Two points are important to make in relating appraisal theory to our
view. First, in agreement with what we write here, appraisal theory
stresses that emotions involve highly coordinated (often synchronized)
effects in behavior, body, and brain. The flexibility of emotions seen in
pleiotropy, stimulus degeneracy, and trans-situationality emphasizes
this aspect. Second, in disagreement with our view, appraisal theory
takes all of these varied effects to be literally part of the emotion state
(cf. Figure 2A), whereas we view them as consequences that are
caused by a central emotion state (Figure 2B). Appraisal theory bears
considerable resemblance to the kind of decision tree envisioned by
the ethologist Niko Tinbergen (Tinbergen, 1950). A fruitful direction
for research would be to determine the extent to which the emotion
states found in different species are indeed hierarchically organized.(1884) argued that the direction of causality is, in fact, the reverse
of what one might think: ‘‘I feel ‘afraid’ because I run from
the bear; I do not run because I feel afraid,’’ goes the famous
(albeit oversimplified) paraphrase of his theory. In other words,
to the extent that subjective feelings are equated with emotions
in humans (but see below), these feelings are a consequence,
not a cause, of observable expressive behaviors (Figure 3B).
Although this view of the relationship between emotion
and behavior may seem counter-intuitive and others have
argued against it (Cannon, 1927; Panksepp, 1998), it remains a
defended view.This is not to say that behavior cannot also influence emotion
states: of course, our behaviors, once expressed, become
stimuli in their own right, and there is a causal loop from emotion
states to behaviors and back to emotion states (dashed lines in
Figure 2B). Indeed, some theories argue from this fact that
emotion states are so dynamic that it becomes impossible to
say whether the behavior is cause or consequence (Salzman
and Fusi, 2010). This disagreement over causality is, in part, a
result of the purely observational approaches that have been
used to study the link between emotions and behavior in the field
of psychology. In contrast, the virtue of studying the neural basis
of primitive emotion states in model organisms is that one can
directly and rigorously test the causal relationship between
such states and behavior through functional manipulations of
the neural components of such states. We also believe that,
insofar as these primitive emotion states ultimately led to human
emotions through evolution, a similar analysis may be possible in
phylogenetically diverse organisms, provided that such func-
tional manipulations are possible. New technologies for genome
modification, such as CRISPR/Cas9 (Gaj et al., 2013), may make
genetic manipulations of neuronal activity more feasible in a
variety of animal species.
The Relationship between Central Emotion States and
Subjective Feelings
A frequent point of confusion in arguments about emotion, for
semantic as well as conceptual reasons, is the relationship
between subjective feelings and emotion states. The colloquial
usage of the word ‘‘emotion’’ refers to ‘‘feelings,’’ our subjectiveCell 157, March 27, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 189
Figure 3. The Relationship between Central Emotion States and Subjective Feelings
(A andB) Behaviorist version of view inwhich emotional stimuli evoke behavior and other responses in animals (A) without the involvement of any causative central
state. In humans (B), the subjective feeling of emotion is assumed to arise from our conscious awareness of the behavioral and somatic responses to the stimuli
(James, 1884).
(C and D) In our view, responses to emotional stimuli are mediated by central emotion states, which are evoked by those stimuli in both animals (C) and humans
(D). Those central states produce subjective feelings in parallel with behavioral and somatic responses in humans (D). We argue that central states also play an
important role in emotional expression in animals (C), irrespective of whether they have a subjective perception of those states or not.perception of emotion states and their accompanying somatic
responses (although recent theories have been careful to make
a clear distinction between emotion and feelings [Damasio,
2003]). The existence of ‘‘feelings’’ can at present only be
assessed by verbal report and therefore is currently uniquely
accessible to study in humans (Figure 3B). However, if one
were to accept the colloquial definition of ‘‘emotions’’ as sub-
jective feelings, then because we cannot know whether animals
incapable of verbal report have such feelings (Figure 3A), it would
follow that we cannot study ‘‘emotions’’ in any organism other
than Homo sapiens (LeDoux, 2012).
Our view is that animals, like humans, have central emotion
states even if they are not consciously aware of them (Figure 3C).
We, like others before us (Dolan, 2002; Damasio, 2003; Panksepp,
1998; Rolls, 1999; Salzman and Fusi, 2010), argue that there
is no reason a priori to exclude this possibility and that the evolu-
tionary similarities between emotional expressions in humans
and animals, as observed byDarwin, suggest that animals—inver-
tebrates as well as vertebrates—have central emotion states as
well. Consistent with this view, there is some evidence that even
humans may have emotions of which they are not consciously
aware (Winkielman and Berridge, 2004); and conversely, there
are views that animals have emotion states that provide basic
building blocks for feelings, only much less elaborated in nature
(Damasio, 2003;BerridgeandKringelbach,2013;Panksepp1998).
The idea that animals have central emotion states with certain
general and fundamental properties (which we will discuss
below) and that these states play a causal role in transforming
certain kinds of stimuli into characteristic, species-typical
behaviors should prompt the search for such states and the
neural circuit-level mechanisms that encode them in model
organisms. By analogy, in the same way that we have learned
a great deal about the neurobiology of vision by studying animal
models without worrying about trying to solve the problem of
how we have conscious visual experiences, we can learn
much about the neural encoding of central emotion states in
animals without concerning ourselves with the subjective, con-
scious perception of such states.190 Cell 157, March 27, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.Emotion ‘‘Primitives’’ and Their Behavioral Expression
Below, we attempt to delineate some of the evolutionary
‘‘building blocks,’’ or ‘‘emotion primitives,’’ that describe central
emotion states. These features are common to different emo-
tions in different animal species. It is possible and even likely
that these features independently evolved to subserve multiple
behavioral and cognitive functions and are combined by the
brain in a specific manner to produce emotion states (Salzman
and Fusi, 2010). Even if that is the case, however, we argue
that understanding such features in terms of neural circuit
activity and brain chemistry will move us a step closer to under-
standing the brain mechanisms underlying emotions.
Scalability
‘‘He who will attend to the starting of his horse.will
perceive how perfect is the gradation from a mere glance
at some unexpected object.to a jump so rapid and
violent that the animal probably could not voluntarily whirl
round in so rapid a manner.’’—Darwin
Emotion states have often been classified according to their
valence (positive or negative) and their intensity (Figure 4A)
(Russell, 1980). One can be annoyed, angry, furious, or enraged
or sad, despondent, or grief-stricken. Some of this gradation
may reflect differences in the level of arousal that is associated
with a particular emotion. Whether such arousal is generic (Pfaff
et al., 2005) or specific to a particular behavioral system (Devidze
et al., 2006) is not yet clear. Arousal in Drosophila has been
studied using assays that test for increases in locomotor activity
or sensitivity to noxious sensory stimuli (van Swinderen and
Andretic, 2003; Greenspan et al., 2001) or using electrophysio-
logical recordings (Nitz et al., 2002; van Swinderen et al.,
2004). Some evidence has been provided for at least two forms
of arousal in the fly, which are regulated in opposite directions by
dopamine (DA) acting through the fly homolog of the D1 DA
receptor (Lebestky et al., 2009).
Gradations in emotional intensity are also associated with
qualitative shifts in the behaviors associated with those states.
‘‘Predator imminence’’ theory, for example, posits that, as the
Figure 4. Dimensional Models of Emotion
(A) A two-dimensional space representingwhat is often called ‘‘core affect,’’ themost popular construct in psychological theories of emotional experience (Barrett
and Russell, 1999; Russell, 2003) but also applied more broadly to other animals (Mendl et al., 2010; Rolls, 1999).
(B) Example of a multidimensional model for separating different emotions into different domains of a state space. According to some views, the space in which
emotion states can be located is extremely high dimensional, consisting of all of the different parameters that one canmeasure (e.g., Salzman and Fusi, 2010) and
essentially formalizing a multivariate version of emotion as depicted in Figure 4B.encounter between a prey animal and a predator becomes
more imminent, the defensive behavior of the former switches
from freezing (which avoids detection) to flight (which avoids
entrapment) (Bolles and Fanselow, 1980; Blanchard et al.,
1998). In octopi, there is a switch from crypsis (camouflage)
behavior to ink jetting and propulsion as a potential threat
becomes more proximate (http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=eS-USrwuUfA). There are relatively few such examples in
Drosophila. ‘‘Low-intensity’’ versus ‘‘high-intensity’’ aggressive
behaviors have been identified through ethograms (Chen et al.,
2002); however, the transitions are not as stereotyped as in the
case of the cricket, G. bimaculatus (Stevenson et al., 2005).
The development of tractable model systems that display this
behavioral phenomenon would allow one to approach the ques-
tion of the underlying neural mechanisms that link graded states
of arousal/drive/motivation to action selection, a process that is
currently poorly understood. Furthermore, the ability to quantita-
tively manipulate the level of excitability in genetically defined
neuronal subpopulations using techniques such as optogenetics
may make it possible to investigate whether scalability imple-
mented as graded differences in spiking activity can lead to
graded or qualitative differences in emotional expression (Lee
et al., 2014).
Psychological models of emotion in humans all feature
scalability as well (Harris et al., 2012). Often this is simply incor-
porated as an arousal dimension (Lang et al., 1993; Russell,
1980, 2003; Russell et al., 1989) (Figure 4A and Box 2),
but many theories also acknowledge phase transitions withparametric increases of some variable, such as transitioning
from mild concern to anxiety to fear to panic (thus leading
to these three emotions seen as distinct in many views;
McNaughton and Corr, 2004). Multidimensional models, how-
ever,may capturemore fully the range of different emotion states
(Figure 4B).
Valence
‘‘When actions of one kind have become firmly associated
with any sensation or emotion, it appears natural that ac-
tions of a directly opposite kind.should be unconsciously
performed.under the influence of a directly opposite
sensation or emotion.’’—Darwin
In our daily life, we infer the existence of a particular emotion in
others through its behavioral expression. In his monograph,
Darwin articulated three principles to explain why certain
emotions are expressed by particular behaviors. The second of
these he called the ‘‘Principle of Antithesis.’’ According to this
principle, emotions come in pairs of opposites (e.g., joy versus
anger; happiness versus sadness), which are expressed by
physically opposite and complementary behaviors (Fig-
ures 5A and 5B). Thus, one operational criterion for recognizing
instances of emotional expression in animals is to look for behav-
iors that appear to be related as such ‘‘antithetical pairs.’’
In model organisms, the simplest example of such an antithet-
ical pairing is directed locomotor activity: this activity may result
either in approach toward or withdrawal from a particular object
or stimulus. In C. elegans, the neural circuitry underlyingCell 157, March 27, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 191
Box 2. Evolution of Emotion Primitives versus Specific Emotions
Valence and intensity can be thought of as evolutionary building blocks
of emotion, or emotion ‘‘primitives.’’ Indeed, they are often considered
the two defining aspects of emotion that distinguish emotions from all
other kinds of mental states (Russell, 2003; Salzman and Fusi, 2010). In
considering the evolution of emotion, it is important to distinguish
between the appearance of emotion per se versus the appearance of
specific emotions: an insect may exhibit a behavior whose properties
reflect emotion primitives, even if it does not correspond to a specific
human emotion. One reason that it is difficult to bridge basic biological
principles of emotion with psychological studies of emotion can prob-
ably be traced to the fact that the psychological studies invariably
emphasize details about specific human emotions (of note, aspects
based on emotional experience, social cognition, and language, e.g.,
Barrett et al., 2007). In humans, many studies have argued for a small
set of so-called ‘‘basic’’ emotions, including happiness, fear, anger,
disgust, and sadness, which are thought to be culturally universal,
especially in their facial expressions (Ekman, 1992). Interestingly, the
axes of valence and intensity have often been used to categorize these
different emotions, according to their degree of similarity (Russell,
2003): some emotions may be high arousal but differ in their valence
(joy versus rage), whereas others may be of similar valence but differ
in their intensity (annoyance versus fury) (Figure 4). Valence and inten-
sity (or two dimensions much like them [Rolls, 1999]) thus typically
capturemuch of the variance in emotional behaviors in human psycho-
logical studies (Russell et al., 1989; Watson and Tellegen, 1985).
Interestingly, functional MRI studies in humans have provided evi-
dence for dissociated representations of valence and intensity with
respect to gustatory or olfactory stimuli (Small et al., 2003; Kringel-
bach, 2005). The appearance of valence and intensity as early emotion
primitives may have provided a framework for diversifying different
types of emotions, thereby linking these two aspects of emotional
evolution.approach versus avoidance to olfactory stimuli is relatively well
understood (reviewed in de Bono and Maricq, 2005; Sengupta,
2007). In Drosophila, male wing posture is orthogonal during
courtship versus aggressive behavior: in courtship, males
extend their wings horizontally and vibrate them to generate a
‘‘song’’ that attracts females (Figure 5C2) (Dickson, 2008); the
neural circuitry underlying this behavior has been dissected in
detail (von Philipsborn et al., 2011). During agonistic interactions
with conspecific males, male flies raise their wings vertically into
a ‘‘wing-threat’’ (Figure 5C1) (Chen et al., 2002). From Darwin’s
perspective, these appendicular postures might constitute an
example of ‘‘antithesis.’’ If so, then the fly’s wings may express
an internal emotion state in a manner analogous to the expres-
sive tail of a cat or a dog. In this context, it is important to note
that emotional expression often (but not always) has a social
communication function either to conspecifics or heterospe-
cifics; courtship song in Drosophila is a clear example of this
feature.
The neurobiological mechanisms underlying the Principle of
Antithesis remain to be understood. At the limit, the simplest
‘‘antithetical’’ actions are those controlled by antagonistic pairs
of flexor and extensor muscles (as noted by Darwin) and their
correspondingmotor inputs. It makes intuitive sense that ‘‘oppo-
site’’ emotion states might exert complementary biases on
particular flexor-extensor pairs, but the underlying neural mech-192 Cell 157, March 27, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.anisms remain to be elucidated. One clue comes from the
famous experiments of Kravitz and colleagues demonstrating
that injection of octopamine versus serotonin in lobsters can
trigger subordinate versus dominant postures, respectively
(Livingstone et al., 1980), although the neurobiological mecha-
nisms underlying this effect remain unclear (Kravitz and Huber,
2003). Some neuroimaging studies in humans have also sug-
gested that responses to oppositely valenced stimuli are
represented in distinct regions of the brain (Small et al., 2003;
Kringelbach, 2005).
In psychological theories of emotion, valence (antithesis) and
arousal (intensity) are taken to be essential features of all emo-
tions and ones that define what in the psychological literature
is referred to as ‘‘core affect’’ (Russell, 2003; Barrett et al.,
2007) (Figure 4A). In this respect, these two features of emotion
states are thought also to distinguish emotions from othermental
states that we might attribute to an organism. Recent work has
emphasized that these two attributes need not correspond to as-
pects of the conscious experience of emotion but can be thought
of as parameters that define a similarity space in which all
emotion states can be related to one another (Salzman and
Fusi, 2010). It is also worth noting that there may be instances
of antithesis that do not seem to fall on opposite ends of a pos-
itive versus negative valence dimension. For instance, Susskind
et al. (2008) have shown that fear and disgust expressions in hu-
mans have opposite effects on increasing versus decreasing the
intake of sensory information, respectively (fear widens the eyes
and nostrils to acquire cues about potential danger; disgust
squints the eyes and nostrils to shut out aversive taste and
odors). The precise psychological dimension corresponding to
Darwin’s original concept of ‘‘antithesis’’ (which was entirely
behaviorally defined) thus remains to be fully understood.
Persistence
‘‘A man may have his heart filled with the blackest hatred
or suspicion, or be corroded with envy or jealousy.these
feelings.commonly last for some time.’’—Darwin
A key feature that distinguishes emotional behaviors from
simple stimulus response (SR) reflexes is that these behaviors,
or associated state variables, often outlast the stimuli that elicit
them. For example, heart rate, blood pressure, and levels of
stress hormones can remain elevated for many minutes
following exposure to a threat or other stressor. In humans, anx-
iety or depression can continue for very prolonged periods of
time, with a sustained and pervasive effect on experience, cogni-
tion, and behaviors. This feature of persistence makes emotions
powerfully flexible in how they can control cognition and
behavior and therefore is worth searching for in model systems.
In Drosophila, repeated presentations of a noxious mechanical
stimulus (air puffs) promote a persistent state of elevated loco-
motor activity (Figure 6A), the duration of which is controlled by
dopamine (Lebestky et al., 2009). Studies in C. elegans have
identified neuropeptides, biogenic amines, and the underlying
circuitry that controls opposing, persistent behavioral states
such as roaming in remarkable detail (Chalasani et al., 2007;
Flavell et al., 2013) (Figures 6B and 6C). Recent studies in
Drosophila have shown that brief optogenetic activation of a
specific population of brain interneurons controlling courtship
Figure 5. Examples of Darwin’s Second Principle of Antithesis
According to this principle, opposite emotions produce behaviorally opposite expressions.
(A) In humans, sadness (A1) and happiness (A2) are expressed by opposite configurations of the mouth.
(B) Antithetical postures in dogs, from Darwin (1872).
(C) A potential example of antithesis in Drosophila. Male flies elevate both wings close to the vertical in a ‘‘threat display’’ during agonistic interactions with
conspecific males (C1), whereas they extend one wing horizontally to vibrate it in order to produce a courtship ‘‘song’’ during mating (C2). Axes indicate the
different angles of view (C1, frontal; C2, overhead). This example also illustrates the social communication function of some types of emotional expression.song (von Philipsborn et al., 2011) can lead to persistent singing
lasting for minutes (Inagaki et al., 2014) (Figure 6D). The neural
mechanism underlying persistence in this case remains to be
elucidated.
Interestingly, some forms of persistence may be intimately
related to scalability at the level of neural circuits (Major and
Tank, 2004). Increases in the scalar value of state parameters
(e.g., spiking rate of some neurons or levels of a neuromodulator)
during an encounter with a predator or during a social interaction
with a conspecific may reflect the integration or accumulation
over time of sensory inputs. This integration may be used in at
least two ways, not mutually exclusive: to provide cumulative
information leading to behavioral decisions and action selection
and to increase the state of arousal/drive/motivation of the
animal. Many instantiations of neural integrators require persis-
tent activity of some sort either at the level of individual neurons
or at the circuit level (Major and Tank, 2004; Ratcliff andMcKoon,
2008). Persistent activity underlying neural integrators may
continue even after the sensory inputs being integrated are no
longer present. In this way, persistence could be a natural
consequence of the neural coding mechanisms that underlie
scalability.
Generalization
‘‘When any sensation, desire, dislike, etc. has led during
a long series of generations to some voluntary movement,
then a tendency to the performance of a similar movement
will almost certainly be excited, whenever the same,or any analogous or associated sensation.is experi-
enced.’’—Darwin
One consequence of persistence is that an emotion state
induced by one stimulus can generalize to a different context
and thereby influence subsequent responses to different stimuli.
In this way, emotions bias cognition and behavior. This criterion
amounts to context generalization, or ‘‘trans-situationality.’’ This
property well illustrates the pervasive effects of emotions on
behavior and offers another respect in which they differ from
SR reflexes. Applying this criterion would, for example, allow
one to distinguish whether the response of an insect to an aver-
sive stimulus, such as a shadow (Card and Dickinson, 2008), is
simply a reflex or involves a persistent internal state that can
generalize to other contexts or affect subsequent behavioral
decisions. In honeybees, traumatic stress (vigorous mechanical
shaking) caused a persistent ‘‘pessimistic cognitive bias’’ in
terms of the behavior the bees showed in an ambiguous odor
choice assay (Bateson et al., 2011), implying the induction of
an internal state caused by the shaking that could operate across
contexts (e.g., during the odor choice) (Mendl et al., 2011).
Another aspect of generalizability of emotion states comes
from two features that could be called ‘‘stimulus generalizability’’
(or stimulus ‘‘degeneracy’’) and ‘‘pleiotropy’’: the sensory causes
of a given emotion state can ‘‘fan in’’ from a multitude of stimuli;
in turn, the consequences of an emotion state ‘‘fan out’’ to a
multitude of effects. The feature of stimulus generalizability is
described by Darwin in the first of his three principles ofCell 157, March 27, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 193
Figure 6. Experimental Examples of Persistent Activity in Flies and Worms
(A) Persistent elevation of locomotor activity evoked by repeated mechanical startle (using brief air puffs) in Drosophila. Modified from Lebestky et al. (2009).
(B and C) Persistent roaming behavior in C. elegans evoked by optogenetic stimulation of a specific subset of interneurons under the control of the mod-1
promoter. (C) Circuit model summarizing control of persistent and opponent dwelling and roaming states (B and C). Modified from Flavell et al. (2013).
(D) Transient optogenetic activation of P1 neurons in Drosophila using a red-shifted version of channelrhodopsin-2 (green bars) evokes persistent wing extension
behavior (black rasters). Modified from Inagaki et al. (2014).emotional expression, called the principle of Serviceable [Useful]
Associated Habits (Darwin, 1872). According to this principle,
the same behavioral expression can be triggered by many
different stimuli and different contexts, including those for which
the behavior appears to serve no useful (‘‘serviceable’’) purpose,
if those stimuli evoke the same internal emotion state. Darwin’s
classic example of this phenomenon is that of a cat that kneads
its paws on a soft blanket. This behavior is ‘‘serviceable’’ (useful)
in kittens to stimulate the flow of milk from a nursing mother but
has no clear utility in relation to the blanket in an adult cat. Darwin
argues that, in such cases, the behavior becomes associated
either through learning (‘‘habit’’) or inheritance with the central
state (in this example, presumably ‘‘pleasure’’) to the degree
that any stimulus that elicits that same state will elicit the same
behavior. As Darwin and later Ekman noted, a source of positive
selection for some apparently ‘‘useless’’ behavioral expressions
is that they may indeed have utility in the context of communi-
cating the animal’s internal emotion state (Darwin, 1872).
Darwin noted that the strong link between stimuli and
the emotion states that they elicit can be either inherited or194 Cell 157, March 27, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.associated by habit—in other words, through learning and
memory. A familiar example of such ‘‘emotional learning’’ is
Pavlovian fear conditioning, in which a neutral ‘‘conditioned’’
stimulus (CS), such as a tone, is able to evoke an emotional
behavior, such as freezing, following repeated pairing of that
CS with an ‘‘unconditioned’’ stimulus (US) that innately evokes
emotional behavior, such as a footshock. The amygdala, a struc-
ture whose role in emotion we already mentioned above, is
known to be necessary for Pavlovian fear conditioning in rodents
(Davis, 1992) as well as in humans (Bechara et al., 1995). There is
now a large literature from reinforcement learning, applied widely
across species, that provides important intersection with the
study of emotion (Clark et al., 2012; see Box 3).
Emotion states are also pleiotropic, meaning that they have
multiple, parallel effects: they influence many different aspects
of behavior and also have internal somatic effects, as well as
effects on cognition (Figure 2B). For example, responses caused
by a fear-like central state not only include defensive behaviors,
such as freezing or flight, but also endocrine changes such as
increases in stress hormone levels; changes in autonomic
Box 3. Emotions and Learning
There is substantial intersection between the study of emotions and
the burgeoning field of appetitive and aversive classical conditioning.
The prototypic example of Pavlovian fear conditioning illustrates the
basic phenomenon: while an initially restricted class of stimuli that
are innately aversive (e.g., electric shock) elicit behaviors that look
emotional (e.g., jumping), there is considerable flexibility in the system.
A much larger set of stimuli (e.g., a tone reliably paired with the shock)
can elicit fear behaviors after learning (andmoreover, those fear behav-
iors are also more diverse and flexible than simply duplicating the
unconditioned response: whereas a mouse may jump when shocked,
it may freeze when it hears the sound). Much of the plasticity for such
emotional learning occurs at the interface between sensory processing
and the central emotion state, thus allowing multiple stimuli, through
learning, to access or evoke an emotion state that they could not
causally influence before.
Conditioned olfactory avoidance and its molecular and neural circuit
basis have been extensively studied inDrosophila (Keene andWaddell,
2007). However, this assay is not entirely analogous tomammalian fear
conditioning in that the CS odor is typically not neutral but, rather,
innately aversive. Perhaps closer approximations to emotional learning
are provided by the conditioned place preference/aversion (CPP/CPA)
tests in which an animal learns to prefer or avoid a specific but neutral
environment (chamber) that is paired with a pleasant or unpleasant
stimulus, respectively. For example, crayfish have been shown to
exhibit CPP to cocaine (Huber et al., 2011). A modification of this
test, involving associations with neutral odors, has been used to
demonstrate that alcohol has rewarding properties in Drosophila
(Kaun et al., 2011). More recently, Heberlein and colleagues have
shown that male Drosophila can be positively conditioned to an
odor-laced location by presenting that odor during mating with a virgin
female (Shohat-Ophir et al., 2012). This observation and the finding
that the response to virgin females involves neuropeptide Y (NPY),
which also controls ethanol-based reward learning, implies that mating
does not simply involve a series of concatenated and serially depen-
dent SR reflexes (sometimes referred to as ‘‘stigmergy’’ [Giuggioli
et al., 2013]) but, rather, involves the induction of a rewarding internal
state.
Box 4. The Somatic Component of Emotions
‘‘Joy quickens the circulation, and this stimulates the
brain, which again reacts on the whole body.’’—Darwin
Ever since William James, the somatic component of emotional reac-
tions has received particular attention in emotion theories (e.g., Craig,
2008; Damasio, 2003). These somatic components involve autonomic
reactions such as changes in heart rate, blood pressure, breathing, and
sweaty palms, aswell as changes in the state of internal organs such as
the gut. Importantly, as recognized by Darwin (see above), somatic
components of an emotional response are not only caused by the cen-
tral emotion states, but also react back on the brain to further modify
those states (Figure 2B), a process termed ‘‘interoception,’’ the brain’s
detection of the body’s internal state. It has been argued that a central
feature of ‘‘feeling states’’ in humans reflects our conscious experience
of interoception (Craig, 2008; Damasio, 2003). But that does not mean
that animals that (may) lack such a subjective perception, or conscious
awareness, of interoceptive states necessarily lack somatic responses
to emotional stimuli, or interoception, per se: the ability to detect such
somatic responses with their brains. There is much to be learned about
the neurobiology of interoception, not only in mammalian systems but
especially in model organisms such as Drosophila, without trying to
fathom the basis of its subjective perception in humans.function such as increased heart rate, blood pressure, and
sweaty palms; and changes in attention and memory encoding
(in humans). Psychological theories of human emotion have
also emphasized the multicomponent nature of emotions, typi-
cally including subjective experience and neurophysiological
processes, as well as somatic and endocrine ones. Simple reflex
responses are not typically associated with such multidimen-
sional features.
Internal emotion states also alter sensorimotor information
processing. For example, in Drosophila and in other insects,
the state of hunger (sometimes called a ‘‘homeostatic emotion’’
[Craig, 2003]) increases behavioral sensitivity to sucrose (Inagaki
et al., 2014; Dethier, 1976). This increase is mediated by an
increase in the tonic activity of certain dopaminergic neurons
(Marella et al., 2012), which release dopamine onto the terminals
of sugar-sensing gustatory neurons, increasing calcium influx in
response to sucrose (Inagaki et al., 2014). Such studies illustrate
the utility of Drosophila for identifying neural mechanisms of
state encoding and demonstrating their causality in state-
dependent behavioral changes.Finally, it is important to note that the features of context/
stimulus generalization and pleiotropy also mean that the causal
architecture within which an emotion state operates can become
quite complex. This complexity, together with the persistence
feature that we noted earlier, means that, as an emotion state un-
folds over time, the very behavior that it causes can in turn feed
back onto the state (Figure 2B). This feedback aspect, whichwas
already noted by William James, has been given much attention
specifically in terms of the somatic effects of an emotion (Box 4).
Recognizing Emotional Expression in Mammals, Model
Organisms, and Martians
In any nonhuman model organism, to study experimentally the
neural underpinnings of emotion states, it is necessary to identify
expressive behaviors that can serve as a phenotypic ‘‘readout’’
of experimental manipulations of brain circuitry and chemistry.
Emotional behaviors in mammals are typically recognized by
homology to human behaviors and more recently by the involve-
ment of homologous neuroanatomical structures involved in
specific human emotions. For example, fear behaviors such as
freezing and the experience of fear require the amygdala in
humans (Feinstein et al., 2011). Rodents and other mammals
exhibit many similar fear behaviors such as freezing, and this
requires the amygdala as well (Vazdarjanova et al., 2001; Choi
and Kim, 2010). Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that behaviors
like freezing can be ‘‘emotional’’ behaviors in mammals, whether
or not the animal has a conscious or subjective experience of
‘‘fear’’ as we recognize it in ourselves (LeDoux, 2012).
However, these criteria are difficult to apply to phylogenetically
distant organisms that do not freeze and that lack an amygdala.
We have argued that model organisms, such as Drosophila or
C. elegans, may exhibit primitive emotional behaviors even if
those behaviors are not homologous to our own. But how can
one identify such behaviors and distinguish them from simple
(SR) reflexes? Put another way, if we landed on Mars and littleCell 157, March 27, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 195
green men approached our spaceship, how would we know if
they had emotions or not? Asmentioned earlier, Darwin provided
little general guidance on this issue, other than anthropocentric
homology. However, given his assumption that central emotion
states are expressed by observable behaviors, we suggest that,
as a starting point, onemay look for certain behaviors that exhibit
some or all of the core properties that we attribute to internal
emotion states themselves, as described above. One can then
begin to investigate whether the properties of such behaviors
are indeed causally controlled by internal brain states through
experimental identification and perturbation of the mechanisms
that underlie such properties.
An alternative to the view that invertebrate model organisms
have emotions is that their behavior instead reflects a series of
dependent, concatenated SR reflexes, a process sometimes
referred to as ‘‘stigmergy’’ (Giuggioli et al., 2013). According to
this view, for example, courtship behavior in Drosophila would
not express a central emotion state but, rather, would comprise
a series of reflexive responses triggered by specific sensory
cues. (These responses may, in turn, feed back as additional
stimuli to elicit further reflex actions.) One implication of this
view is that, in contrast to humans and other mammalian spe-
cies, flies do not mate because sex is associated with a state
of reward but, rather, because they are genetically programmed
to do so if they encounter a potential mate emitting appropriate
‘‘releasing signals’’ (Tinbergen, 1950). Arguing against this view,
however, are experiments showing thatDrosophilamales can be
conditioned to be attracted to an odor that has previously been
paired with an episode of mating (Shohat-Ophir et al., 2012),
suggesting that mating is rewarding (Panksepp, 1998; see also
Box 2). Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, transient activation
of certain courtship neurons can evoke a persistent state of
courtship behavior (Inagaki et al., 2014). Therefore, although
stigmergic processes may explain some complex insect behav-
iors, this does not exclude the possibility that other behaviors are
caused by central emotion states.
Uniquely Human Features?
There may well be emotion states that are unique to humans, or
primates, or mammals—with likely candidates being some of the
‘‘social’’ or ‘‘moral’’ emotions (Tangney et al., 2007) (it seems
unlikely that flies have pride or embarrassment). The emotion
of awe has sometimes been proposed as being truly unique to
humans (Keltner and Haidt, 2003). However, it would seem
that all of the features that apply to emotions more generally
also apply to these emotion states that may be species specific.
A different question is whether there are any features of
emotions as such that may be unique to humans (or primates
or mammals). Three leading candidates are volitional control,
subjective report, and stimulus-decoupled elicitation, aspects
that we briefly discuss next.
Volitional Control
Control over one’s emotions is a feature of adult human emo-
tions that is not typically observed in nonhuman animals
(although to some extent this can be trained in certain species),
nor in human infants or children (where again extensive training is
required throughout development to reach the adult level of con-
trol). There are good neurological reasons for the developmental196 Cell 157, March 27, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.emergence: regulation of emotion in humans is known to rely
substantially on signals from the prefrontal cortex, a brain region
whose connectivity is still immature in childhood. Prefrontal
cortex is one of the latest regions in development to become
myelinated, and its protracted developmental timeline accounts
for the difficulties that young children have in metacognition,
aspects of attention, and volitional control over behavior,
thought, and emotion (Thompson et al., 2000).
A major mechanism for psychopathology in humans is thought
to be an impaired ability to regulate one’s emotions. Psychiatric
disorders, in particular, arise in large part from dysfunction in
the regulation of emotion, with examples ranging from posttrau-
matic stress disorder to phobias. Cognitive-behavioral routes to
therapy capitalize on this insight and utilize various strategies
to re-establish cognitive control over one’s emotions (exposure
therapy perhaps being the clearest case). There is relatively little
work yet at the neurological level, though neuroimaging studies
support the general idea of a role for prefrontal cortex in such
regulation (Ochsner and Gross, 2005) (the issue is somewhat
complicated by the fact that humans can regulate their emotions
in at least two different ways, cognitive re-interpretation of a
situation or active suppression of emotional reactions [Gross,
2002]).
Volitional control over emotional expressions has conse-
quences for their social communicative role (an important
function of many emotional expressions), opening the door to
deception and manipulation of conspecifics—something that
humans engage in all the time. Indeed, skilled humans who are
capable of convincingly counterfeiting emotions on cue can
command salaries of tens of millions of dollars—we call them
‘‘actors.’’ There is, however, scant evidence of emotional deceit
in other animals. As with other features possibly unique to
humans, volitional control over emotions—to the degree that
adult humans have it—does not violate any of the above features
that we noted but expands upon them to permit an even more
flexible interface between central emotion states and the rest of
cognition and behavior.
Subjective Report
Psychological investigations of emotion in humans are not
generally based on observations of behavior but on verbal report
(Figures 2A and 2B). Indeed, in our own case, we typically
identify emotion states within ourselves without resort to
behavioral observation, unlike what we do for other people or
animals. Some work using functional imaging in humans, as
well as studies in rodents, has pointed to particular brain struc-
tures, such as parts of orbitofrontal cortex and the nucleus
accumbens, that may be particularly important for the subjective
experience of emotions. Moreover, there is some evidence for
topographic segregation of emotional experiences, albeit only
at the coarse level of ‘‘pleasure’’ versus ‘‘aversion’’ (correspond-
ing to the dimension of valence we noted above) (for review, see
Berridge and Kringelbach, 2013).
It is important, however, to note that the above facts do not
impinge on the features of emotion that we enumerated: they
hold for an emotion state regardless of how it is identified
(whether through behavioral observation, verbal report, or other
means). Given our view that emotions should be construed
as central states, we would suggest that both behavior and
Figure 7. Schematic Illustrating Components of the Central Circadian Oscillator in Drosophila
PER, TIM, CYC, and CLK are transcription factors that participate in a negative-feedback autoregulatory loop. The output of this oscillator coordinates multiple
organismal processes that display circadian periodicity. Modified from Nitabach and Taghert (2008).subjective report are caused by a common central emotion state
(Figure 2B). As we noted earlier (and in contrast to predominant
psychological theories Figure 2A), neither behavior nor feeling
are themselves part of the emotion state but instead should be
viewed as consequences of it (and can be pieces of evidence
for it). As with behavior, this reformulation frees us of the need
to identify human-like feelings (or indeed any feelings) in other
animals (Figures 3C and 3D). Emotion states cause certain
behaviors in Drosophila, somewhat different sets of behaviors
in rodents, and yet different behaviors in humans. Analogously,
emotion states cause subjective reports of experiences that
we call emotional feelings in humans, may cause different kinds
of experiences in other animals if only we knew how to measure
them, and may cause none at all in yet other species. If subjec-
tive report is no longer considered a defining feature of central
emotion states, then to the extent that we can measure such
states and their associated behaviors in model organisms, we
can study their mechanistic underpinnings and their causal roles
in emotional behavior.
Stimulus Decoupling
Another feature that is prominent in humans could be considered
an elaboration on stimulus generalizability that we mentioned
above. Not only may a given emotion state be caused by a larger
set of eliciting stimuli in humans than in other animals—it can be
caused by no direct stimulus at all. In humans, many and
perhaps most emotion states are caused not by direct confron-
tations with specific stimuli (e.g., a predator) but, rather, by the
anticipation or recollection of such stimuli. The increased meta-
cognitive abilities of humans also make possible the elicitation of
emotion states through thoughts, or imaginings, about all kinds
of situations that one has not in fact experienced: one’s own
mortality, for instance—a large topic of research in psychology
(e.g., studied in terror management theory) that is unlikely to
find a parallel in other animals. Once again, none of this is in
conflict with the criteria that we list for an emotion: it simply notes
that the sets of eliciting conditions and the kinds of behavioral
patterns that are linked to an emotion state are vastly more
complex in humans than in other animals.Experimental Investigation of Central Emotion States
We have argued that ‘‘emotions’’ are a type of central neural
state that are caused by sensory stimuli or memories and that,
in turn, control a panoply of behavioral, cognitive, and somatic
changes (Figure 2B). These central states have certain proper-
ties that generalize across different emotions in the same spe-
cies and across different species whether they have the same
particular emotions or not.
So, how should we look for examples of such central states?
And how would we know if we found one? We do not even
know the level of biological organization or function at which
such states are instantiated—they could be a neuromodulatory
system, a neuroanatomical structure, a distributed neural
network, a type of firing pattern (e.g., oscillation at a certain fre-
quency), or all of the above. Asmentioned earlier, we do not even
know whether such states are instantiated in a unitary mecha-
nism or, rather, are cobbled together from multiple interacting
mechanisms. Indeed, one of themajor challenges facingmodern
neuroscience is to understand how functional states, whether
emotional or not, are instantiated in the brain.
One example illustrating the way that one may distinguish
between a ‘‘central state’’ and its outputs is provided by the
discovery of the mechanisms underlying circadian rhythms in
Drosophila. Like emotions, circadian oscillators control a
‘‘central state’’—in this case, cyclical changes in system-wide
biological processes (including behavior, physiology, and meta-
bolism) that are entrained to the 24 hr day-night cycle. Genetic
(Konopka and Benzer, 1971) and molecular studies (reviewed
in Nitabach and Taghert, 2008) have revealed that the central
circadian oscillator is instantiated in a collection of transcription
factors that function in an autoregulatory negative-feedback
network. Importantly, loss- or gain-of-function geneticmanipula-
tions in components of this central oscillator machinery changed
the pattern (period, amplitude) of oscillations in multiple biolog-
ical outputs of the clock, in a parallel and synchronous manner
(Figure 7). In contrast, analogous genetic manipulations of a
single output of the clock changed only the oscillations of that
output without affecting other outputs in a parallel manner.Cell 157, March 27, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 197
Only through such genetic tests of causality, therefore, was it
ultimately possible to distinguish the ‘‘coding’’ of the central
state itself from the outputs of the state.
The point of this example is to show that a defining feature of a
central state is that experimental perturbations of that state
should affect multiple outputs of that state in a parallel, coordi-
nated manner. That acid test requires the ability to manipulate
components of the state, whether they are genes or cells, and
such manipulations are most readily performed in genetically
tractable model organisms.
So how should one search for the components of such a
central state? We favor the idea that central emotion states are
most likely instantiated at the neural circuit level. One potential
example of such an instantiation in mammals is circuits that
involve the amygdala, a structure which has long been associ-
ated with negative emotions such as fear but which has increas-
ingly been associated with positive emotions as well (Gallagher
and Chiba, 1996; Paton et al., 2006; Tye et al., 2011; Jennings
et al., 2013). Importantly, the amygdala is not a unitary structure
but, rather, consists of multiple substructures (‘‘subnuclei’’) (Pit-
ka¨nen et al., 1997), whose collective functional properties control
several of the different dimensions that constitute outputs of
an emotion state (Figure 2B). For example, loss- and gain-of-
functionmanipulations of the central nucleus, medial subdivision
(CeM), by electrical stimulation, lesions, or more recently opto-
genetic perturbations (Johansen et al., 2012) affect behavioral,
autonomic, and endocrine correlates of the ‘‘fear’’ state in a
parallel manner. These parallel ‘‘pleiotropic’’ outputs are medi-
ated by projections from CeM to distinct downstream struc-
tures (Davis, 1992; LeDoux, 1995). The basolateral amygdala,
in contrast, projects to the medial prefrontal cortex (Senn
et al., 2014), and this projectionmay underlie cognitive or subjec-
tive aspects of the ‘‘fear’’ state in higher organisms, including
humans (for a more complex scheme whereby amygdala-pre-
frontal circuits implement an emotion state in a dynamic fashion,
see Salzman and Fusi [2010]). Finally, the lateral amygdala is well
known for its role in fear conditioning (Maren and Quirk, 2004),
though circuits in the lateral subdivision of CeA may contribute
as well (Ehrlich et al., 2009).
A drawback of mammalian systems, however, is that it is
currently difficult if not impossible to search for such emotional
circuit nodes in an unbiased and systematic manner. Although
candidates for such nodes can be sought in humans by brain-
wide functional MRI, the ability to test the causal relationship
between the activity of such nodes and emotion states is
extremely limited and is dependent on serendipitous, rare
patients with lesions in brain structures of interest. In Drosophila,
by contrast, it is now possible to carry out systematic, unbiased
screens for neurons whose functional perturbation results in
measurable behavioral alterations (Simpson, 2009; von Philips-
born et al., 2011). Using such an approach, it was recently
possible to identify a small cluster of neurons whose experi-
mental activation or inhibition altered the levels of multiple,
distinct aggressive behaviors in parallel and in the same direction
(Asahina et al., 2013). These cells also appear to control an
internal state that may correspond to ‘‘aggressiveness’’ or
aggressive arousal via release of the neuropeptide tachykinin.198 Cell 157, March 27, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.Importantly, it is not necessarily the case that all of the
functional properties of a given central emotion state are instan-
tiated in a single brain structure or circuit. Instead, theymay have
been assembled during evolution by combining pre-existing,
behaviorally relevant functional ‘‘neural modules’’ in a manner
that allowed the generation of the more complex central
states that we call ‘‘emotion.’’ In that case, the properties of
the central state that we have delineated here would be distrib-
uted among distinct but coupled systems, some of which may
individually be used for non-emotional processes. Even in that
case, however, a mechanistic understanding of such ‘‘emotion
primitives’’ in model organisms should provide important
insights into the control of emotional behavior and would
allow tests to ascertain the way in which such modules are
coordinated.
Future Directions
There is no shortage of challenges to a scientific understanding
of emotions. Simply put, much of the work remains to be done.
What we hope to have done here is to break the ground, so to
speak, by specifying core features that can form the basis for
studies of emotion across phylogeny, from worms to flies to
rodents to primates, including humans. Four experimental direc-
tions are: (1) to apply our list of features to identify and study
specific central emotion states and their associated behaviors
in a specific species; (2) to understand how those states (partic-
ularly scalable, persistent states) are encoded in the brain; (3) to
understand the causal relationship of those states to behavior;
and (4) to explore the features, or a subset of them, in parallel
studies across a range of species. Ultimately, this should allow
us to move beyond the question of when specific emotions like
fear evolved to the more fundamental question of when and
how emotion states per se first appeared in evolution. Most
importantly, the focus on emotions as central states with com-
mon, general properties should create a common language
that will facilitate interactions between scientists studying this
elusive property in humans and those working on less complex
but more experimentally tractable model systems.
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